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Deregulation and Litigation
by StephenJ. Friedman
The regulator's attitude toward his professional life is
well captured by a story about the enormously successful
and prolific Japanese artist Katsushika Hokusai. As he
lay dying at the age of 90, after producing over 13,000
prints and drawings, his daughter heard him murmur
"Oh, if I could only have just five more years, I could
become a really great painter."
So it is with regulators. Engaged in a constant battle
with a diverse, innovative and aggressive private sector
that is constantly seeking new ways under, over and
around the regulatory barriers, the regulator keeps
tinkering with the regulatory system, believing in his
heart that in only a few years it will be just right. Sometimes, in the heat of battle, the original policy objectives
are lost, and the regulatory system takes on a life of its
own. At that point, the pendulum begins to swing back
toward deregulation. Today, we are somewhere on the
arc of that backswing.
What does this trend mean for litigation? It will not do
to say simply that less regulation means less enforcement
or less litigation; nor, on the other hand, is it necessarily
the case that a lower level of enforcement means a transfer of enforcement responsibility to the private bar.
There are four general problems associated with overregulation. The remedies proposed for each evil contain
different implications for litigation. Those problem areas
are:
the restrictions on competition and market forces
that flow from economic regulation;
the cost burdens imposed by the new ventures into
health and safety regulations of the late 1960s and
the 1970s;
the rigidity and drag on innovation introduced by
excessively detailed rules; and
the general level of government intrusion into the
private sector.
Much of the regulatory apparatus that blossomed durMr. Friedman, a partner in Debevoise & Plirnpton in New York City,
h a former member of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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ing the first half of this century and the end of the last
grew from concern about excessive market power as a
result of a naturally dominant market position. The ICC,
FCC, CAB and other agencies fall into that category. As
those agencies evolved, they came to see their roles as
protecting regulated companies from "excessive competition," and regulation became a force for higher prices,
fueling inflation.
The Carter administration began to dismantle much of
that economic regulatory structure. In fact, deregulation
is probably the most significant accomplishment of that
administration in the economic area. The CAB is being
eliminated. There has been substantial deregulation in
trucking, railroads and communications. In banking,
deposit interest rate controls are being phased out,
restricti'ons on functions are being blurred, and barriers
to interstate banking are crumbling. The Reagan administration is pressing forward with this effort, spearheaded
by its prompt deregulation of oil prices and the struggle
to resist the rising tide of protectionism.

Dramatic Example
Economic deregulation will assuredly mean fewer formal administrative proceedings. If an agency is no longer
in the business of allocating routes, approving rates or
fixing prices, that litigation will drop sharply. There is
probably no more dramatic example than the fall off in
litigation following the decontrol of oil prices. Immediately before President Reagan took office, there were
more than 1,500 people administering the price control
system and its related web of allocation rules. To put that
total in perspective, throughout most of its life the SEC
staff has ranged in size between 1,500 and 2,000.
The reduction in administrative proceedings and related enforcement work will not be supplanted by private
sector litigation, since in large measure the substantive
rules themselves will disappear. However, antitrust litigation will probably increase as the antitrust immunity
conferred by regulatory approval of pricing behavior or
mergers begins to fall away.
The second complaint about overregulation is the
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asserted excessive cost burdens it imposes on the productive process. In general, this contention is aimed not at
the financial regulatory agencies such as the SEC and the
bank regulators, or the economic regulators of market
power, but rather against the agencies administering
health and safety rules.
Governments have imposed "unproductive" costs in
the form of fire and building codes for a long time. But
concern for air and water quality and highway safety,
and a keener appreciation of the impact of chemical contamination, have escalated these costs.
A double-barreled remedy has been proposed to deal
with these mounting costs: greater executive control
through the Office of Management and Budget, and a
requirement that the agency consider economic burdens
when it adopts new regulations. Although the Supreme
Court recently decided that the Department of Labor was
not required to weigh the costs of OSHA's cotton dust
standard against the benefits, American Textile Mfis.
Inst. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981), Congress may
well require that balancing both for OSHA and for other
agencies.
Weighing costs and benefits is easier said than done,
since it is often difficult to convert health and safety benefits into monetary terms. That difficulty will produce
more litigation instituted by unions and public interest
groups, just as has been true with environmental impact
statements. Indeed, some current legislation requires
analyses much like "inflation impact statements." See,
e.g., Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. $5 601-612.
The attempt to quantify the impact of regulation has
not produced very satisfactory results in agencies such
as the SEC. For example, the Regulatory Flexibility Act
requires the agencies to consider alternatives if a proposed rule will have a "significant economic impact" on
a "substantial number of small entities." 5 U.S.C.
§ 605. In a mature regulatory system like that administered by the SEC, most rulemaking is incremental, involving only adjustments to the existing requirements.
Since the statute does not require a reappraisal of the set
of rules being amended, the statutory threshold is seldom
met.
The proposed requirement that OMB approve new
rules could compromise the status of independent agencies. Agencies would be required to negotiate new rules
with the OMB staff, just as a one-house legislative veto
requires negotiating with the congressional staff. That
approach is outside of the public record; it cannot be
tested through judicial review and it substitutes executive
branch decisionmaking for that of the agency. This encroachment on independent statutory responsibilities
will be the grist for new litigation by labor unions and
public interest groups.
The third major element of deregulation is the effort to
control excessively detailed and rigid rules. These rules
reflect a loss of balance and perspective-a regulatory
myopia.
Any regulatory system rests upon a set of values-in
the case of the SEC, for example, the worth of disclosure
of material facts to the marketplace. The agency's rules
simply implement those values. When a regulatory sys-
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tem is young, the eyes of those who deal with it are firmly
fixed on the values. As it matures, perfection of the regulatory net becomes an independent goal, and the rules
sometimes become divorced from the ultimate values
that gave rise to them.
The success of the regulatory system and the aggressiveness, intelligence and innovation of the regulators
often generate excessive regulation. Regulators are engaged in a constant battle with the efforts of thousands
of market participants to gain a competitive edge by
bypassing some of the rules. The smarter and more experienced the regulator, the more escape routes he will
identify and try to deal with through prophylactic and
sometimes overly rigid rules.
At that point, the agency needs a fresh outlook-a
return to basic assumptions and the means to achieve
them. It requires self-restraint by the regulators or a
restraining hand by an outside agency, such as OMB. It
may be necessary to rely on broad statutory or regulatory
commands rather than detailed recipes for behavior.

Self-Regulation
It is unclear whether this element of deregulation will
produce less litigation. Broad prohibitions can provide as
much opportunity for enforcement as detailed rules. Indeed, the SEC Enforcement Division tends to operate
most vigorously in the interstices between the detailed
rules, acting instead on the basis of standards such as the
antifraud rules or the fiduciary provisions of the Investment Company Act. This is so because self-regulation
works most effectively when there are detailed rules, and
there is thus less need for enforcement action. Moreover,
general prohibitions like the antifraud rules provide regulators with the tools to react to efforts to circumvent
their rules.
Consider the following tradeoffs between regulations
and enforcement in the area of securities regulation.
Before the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was adopted,
the Commission found an adequate legal and practical
basis in its disclosure systems to proscribe the bribery of
foreign officials. The accounting provisions of the Act
now require that issuers maintain an appropriate system
of internal accounting controls and accurate books and
records. But the enforcement litigation under the Act has
been limited in virtually every case to an egregious departure from accepted norms of financial accounting practices, and the charges include general allegations of antifraud violations as well as violations of the accounting
provision of the Act.
Even without the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the
level of SEC enforcement proceedings dealing with conduct now covered by both the antibribery and accounting
provisions would not be significantly lower. In short,
restraint in rulemaking may not mean less enforcement
activity by those agencies, like the SEC, that have general mandates under which they can proceed. Moreover,
the antifraud rules provide a basis for private suits.
Another example of these tradeoffs is provided by the
amendments to section 17 of the Investment Company
Act that were adopted last year in the Small Business In(Please turn to page 50)
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$1 million. One recent verdict
amounted to $2.9 million. These
results have had a strong impact, of
course, upon subsequent settlement
offers in other cases.
Districts vary dramatically in the
percentage of cases that have been
disposed of. Many cases have been
tried in Colorado and the Eastern
District of Virginia. On the other
hand, as of summer 1981, none had
been tried in the Southern District of
New York. Routine calendar delays
and the appointment of a singlejudge
are a major factor in determining how
quickly the cases are resolved.
The American legal system has
proven in recent years that it can
handle in an orderly fashion mass
litigation concerning catastrophies.
The swine flu litigation is another example of this orderly process. The
swine flu litigation can be criticized,
however. for the delavs in some
jurisdictions and the expense-both
for the government and individual
plaintiffs. Moreover, the government
has become an adversarv of the
citizens it originally acted to protect.
No matter who wins the remaining
cases, the wisdom of Congress's decision to permit the government to step
into the private world of the manufacturers and defend the swine flu suits is
certain to be a hotly debated issue the
next time scientists warn of an impending, nationwide health hazard.

Deregulation
& Litigation
(Continued from page 9)
vestment Incentive Act, 15 U.S.C. §$
80a-53-80a-64. Section 17contains a
broad prohibition against transactions involving an investment company and its affiliates. As a practical
matter, many such transactions are a
necessary part of business life for investment companies carrying on venture capital-like activities. The SEC
has power to grant exemptions. In
practice, the Commission gave an
exemption only after a long and detailed negotiation with the investment

company about an "appropriate" set
of conditions to the exemption.
The Small Business Investment Incentive Act was designed to ease the
regulatory burden on publicly held
venture capital companies. Many
transactions involving business development companies and affiliates are
no longer prohibited so long as the
board of directors of the company, including its independent directors,
concludes that the transaction is
"reasonable and fair" and does "not
involve overreaching of [the business
development] company or its shareholders or partners on the part of any
person concerned." 15 U.S.C. 8
80a-56(f)(l). The shift away from a
detailed administrative proceeding
was clearly intended to "get the
government off the backs of investment companies." At the same time,
the breadth of those standards and
their ambiguity will result in additional litigation on the part of both the
SEC and private litigants.

Less Government
Finally, there is an element of
deregulation that comes down to.
nothing more than less government.
It recognizes that some aspects of
human economic behavior are so ambiguous or multi-purpose that government cannot reach the concededly
questionable conduct without unduly
restricting legitimate activity. It accepts the fact that we must tolerate
some abuse to avoid the evils of overregulation.
Some believe that this will mean
reduced enforcement activities. Some
have suggested that this step will
simply shift the locus of the litigation
from the agency to private litigation.
But, in some regulatory regimes, private rights of action do not exist. If
the agency does not act, there is no
action.
The securities law antifraud rules
generally authorize private litigation.
But SEC enforcement proceedings
under the antifraud rules have not
replaced private litigation. The two
have often proceeded side-by-side.
Many Commission enforcement proceedings grow out of its unique access
to information-its inspection program and customer complaint collection system. The lack of a Commission follow-up investigation and the
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attendant publicity may well mean a
lower level of class actions and
derivative actions.
Federal regulators may draw fewer
regulations over the next several
years. And the ones they draw may
contain broader strokes. Some of
these changes will undoubtedly reduce the opportunities for litigation,
but it is uncertain whether the net impact of deregulation will be less litigation.

From

the Bench
(Continued from page 6)
ily depend in some measure on whether you represent a plaintiff or a defendant. If you represent a defendant the
background of the case will already
have been covered by the plaintiff and
by the opening statements, though
you may want at the outset to supply
any vital omissions in the background
or to correct and refute by your first
witness any false or incorrect statements about the background suggested by the witnesses of the plaintiff. If the discrepancies about the
background are great, you may wish
to start over and have your witness
paint an entirely new or different
background more in keeping with
your theories of the case.
If you represent a plaintiff you start
the presentation of evidence laboring
under one distinct disadvantage: you
have to go first. Remember the old
saw that "figures don't lie but liars
do figure." While you are questioning
your client on direct, your opponent
and his lawyer are sitting there listening to everything he says and busily
adjusting their tactics and position
to capitalize on every advantage revealed. In many situations it is a distinct advantage for your opponent to
have to take a position first. Frequently there is nothing you can do
about this and in some cases it makes
little difference, but there are also
many cases in which you should consider completely reversing this advantage by calling the opposite party

